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Abstract	  What	  are	   the	  effects	  of	   the	  economic	  crisis	  on	  electoral	   turnout?	  The	   literature	  predicts	  both	  mobilization	  as	  well	  as	  withdrawal-­‐effects,	  and	  the	  aggregate	  find-­‐ings	  are	   indeed	  inconclusive.	  However,	  while	  there	   is	  no	  uniform	  trend,	  we	  see	  levels	  of	  electoral	  turnout	  decrease	  particularly	  in	  those	  countries	  that	  have	  been	  affected	  most	  strongly	  by	  the	  global	  economic	  recession.	  Existing	  resource-­‐	  and	  incentive-­‐based	   theories	  explain	   this	  decline	  exclusively	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  de-­‐clining	  participation	  of	  the	  losers	  of	  the	  crisis,	  i.e.	  voters	  with	  low	  socio-­‐economic	  resources	  and	  who	  suffer	  increased	  economic	  risk.	  	  In	   this	   paper,	  we	   argue	   that	   such	   a	   view	  neglects	   a	   second	   driver	   of	   declining	  turnout:	   anticipation	   of	   government	   inefficacy.	  Where	   economic	   austerity	   con-­‐strains	   governments,	   highly	   educated	   citizens	   with	   the	   necessary	   political	  knowledge	  and	  sophistication	  anticipate	  the	  inefficacy	  of	  the	  future	  government	  and	   they	   factor	   this	   knowledge	   in	  when	  deciding	   about	   electoral	   participation.	  Therefore,	   the	   positive	   effects	   of	   education	   on	   turnout	   decline	  with	   increasing	  international	  and	  domestic	  austerity	  constraints.	  We	  provide	  cross-­‐sectional	  ev-­‐idence	  for	  this	  argument	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  hierarchical	  regression	  models,	  based	  on	  ESS	  round	  5	  (2010)	  and	  SILC	  survey	  data,	  as	  well	  as	  different	  measures	  of	  gov-­‐ernment	  constraint	  in	  22	  European	  countries	  during	  the	  economic	  crisis.	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1.	  Introduction	  What	   are	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   economic	   crisis	   on	   electoral	   turnout?	  While	   an	   in-­‐creasing	  literature	  studies	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  great	  recession	  on	  government	  reac-­‐tions	  (Pontusson	  and	  Raess	  2012,	  Armingeon	  2012)	  or	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  econom-­‐ic	  voting	  on	  election	  results	  (Fraile	  and	  Lewis-­‐Beck	  2013),	  we	  know	  little	  about	  the	  crucial	  steps	  preceding	  government	  formation,	  let	  alone	  government	  policies,	  i.e.	  the	  question	  whether	  and	  why	  people	  in	  the	  ongoing	  economic	  crisis	  partici-­‐pate	   at	   all	   in	   the	   election	   of	   a	   new	  government.	   Given	   the	   concerns	   that	  many	  scholars	  have	  recently	  raised	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  increasing	  inequality	  and	  aus-­‐terity	   on	   democratic	   legitimacy	   and	   responsiveness	   (Anderson	   and	  Beramendi	  2012;	  Streeck	  and	  Mertens	  2013;	  Schäfer	  2013;	  Mair	  2013;	  Offe	  2013),	  this	  ques-­‐tion	  seems	  of	  utmost	  importance	  and	  topicality.	  	  The	  literature	  suggests	  an	  effect	  of	  economic	  hardship	  on	  electoral	  turnout	  (Mar-­‐tins	  and	  Veiga	  2012),	  but	  remains	  ambivalent	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  effect.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  could	  be	  that	  citizens	  more	  strongly	  feel	  the	  need	  and	  desire	   to	   express	   their	   grievances	   at	   the	   polls	   –	   the	   “mobilization-­‐effect”	   of	   a	  strained	   economic	   context	   (Schlozman	   and	   Verba	   1979).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  however,	   citizens	  may	   turn	   away	   from	   politics	   out	   of	   frustration,	   a	   lack	   of	   re-­‐sources	   or	   shifting	   priorities	   –	   the	   “withdrawal	   effect”	   of	   economic	   hardship	  (Rosenstone	  1982).	   	  The	   turnout	   levels	  at	  post-­‐crisis	  elections	  so	   far,	  however,	  suggest	   that	   there	   is	   no	   linear	   and	   simple	   relationship	  between	   economic	  per-­‐formance	  and	  aggregate	  levels	  of	  electoral	  participation.	  Some	  hard	  hit	  countries	  like	  Slovenia	  or	  Ireland	  show	  an	  increase	  in	  aggregate	  turnout,	  while	  others	  such	  as	   Spain	   and	   especially	   Greece	   have	   exhibited	   a	   sharp	   drop	   in	   turnout.1	  In	   the	  range	  of	  countries	  that	  have	  continued	  to	  grow	  moderately	  over	  this	  time	  period,	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  pattern	  recognizable,	  either.	  	  Germany	  and	  the	  Netherlands,	  for	  instance,	  have	  seen	  a	   significant	  decline	   in	   turnout	   levels	  after	   the	  crisis,	  while	  other	  countries	  such	  as	  Sweden	  exhibit	  higher	  participation	  rates.	  The	  ambivalence	  of	  these	  results	  point	  to	  a	  blind	  spot	  of	  both	  the	  mobilization-­‐	  and	  the	  withdrawal-­‐theories.	  Both	  neglect	  that	  the	  negative	  economic	  effects	  of	  economic	  downturns	  do	  not	  affect	  all	  parts	  of	  the	  society	  equally.	  Moreover,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Sources:	  Döring	  and	  Manow	  (2012),	  Inter-­‐Parliamentary	  Union	  and	  the	  Political	  Data	  Yearbook.	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2.	  Economic	  performance,	  resource	  distribution	  and	  electoral	  participation	  The	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  economic-­‐distributive	  context	  affects	  turnout	  at	  the	  indi-­‐vidual	  and	  at	  the	  aggregate	  levels	  have	  been	  studied	  from	  two	  main,	  but	  largely	  symmetrical	   perspectives,	   focusing	   either	   on	   overall	   economic	   performance	   in	  terms	  of	  growth	  or	  unemployment	  (e.g.	  Rosenstone	  1982,	  more	  recently	  Martins	  and	  Veiga	  2012)	  or	  on	  the	  resulting	  distributive	  consequences,	  notably	  patterns	  of	  inequality	  (e.g.	  Goodin	  and	  Dryzek	  1980,	  more	  recently	  Solt	  2008	  or	  Anderson	  and	  Beramendi	  2011,	  2012).	   In	  both	  strands	  of	   the	   literature,	  we	   find	  different	  theoretical	  arguments	  in	  both	  possible	  directions,	  i.e.	  predicting	  a	  mobilizing	  or	  a	  demobilizing	  effect	  of	  bad	  economic	  performance	  or	  rising	  inequality	  on	  turnout.	  	  	  With	  regard	  to	  possibly	  mobilizing	  effects	  of	  economic	  hardship,	  it	  has	  been	  ar-­‐gued	  that	  economic	  strain	  may	  create	  incentives	  for	  people	  to	  be	  more	  active	  po-­‐litically,	  because	  the	  stakes	  increase	  and	  because	  they	  blame	  the	  government	  and	  want	  to	  make	  their	  discontent	  count	  at	  the	  polls	  (Martin	  and	  Veiga	  2012).	  Simi-­‐larly,	  conflict	  theory	  (Solt	  2008)	  suggests	  that	  increasing	  inequality	  exacerbates	  the	  divergences	  in	  political	  preferences	  between	  the	  economically	  disadvantaged	  and	  the	  more	  well-­‐off	  classes	  in	  society.	  This	  polarization	  is	  supposed	  to	  fuel	  po-­‐litical	   conflict	   about	   the	   right	   distribution	   of	   resources	   and	   thereby	   stimulate	  more	   interest	   and	   participation	   in	   the	   political	   process,	  whereas	   a	  more	   equal	  distribution	  of	  resources	   in	  the	  society	  should	  foster	  consensus	  and	  quiescence	  in	  society,	  resulting	  in	  lower	  levels	  of	  political	  engagement	  (Brady	  2004).	  Theo-­‐ries	   on	   inequality	   and	   participation	   do	   distinguish	   between	   different	   incentive	  structures	   for	   the	   rich	   and	   the	   poor,	   but	   they	   arrive	   at	   the	   same	   conclusion:	  heightened	   economic	   strain	   raises	   the	   stakes	   of	   both	   groups	   in	   politics	   and	  should	  stimulate	  participation	  among	  both	  of	  them.	  	  	  Rosenstone’s	  (1982)	  argument	  on	  “economic	  adversity	  and	  voter	  turnout”,	  while	  also	  advancing	  an	  incentive-­‐based	  argument,	  goes	  in	  exactly	  the	  opposite	  direc-­‐tion.	  He	  argued	   that	   in	   times	  of	   economic	   strain,	   the	  priorities	  of	  persons	  who	  suffer	   economic	   adversity	   shift	   towards	   more	   immediate	   concerns,	   at	   the	   ex-­‐pense	  of	  more	  abstract	  or	  “remote”	  concerns	  such	  as	  politics.	  The	  result	  is	  a	  de-­‐mobilizing	  effect	  of	  economic	  downturns,	  by	  depressing	  participation	  among	  the	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economically	  vulnerable	  parts	  of	  society.	  The	  argument	  that	  increased	  hardship	  depresses,	  rather	  than	  strengthens,	  participation	  is	  also	  shared	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	   studies	   on	   inequality	   and	   participation	   (Anderson	   and	   Beramendi	   2011,	  Beramendi	   and	  Rueda	  2011,	  Pontusson	  and	  Rueda	  2010,	   Schäfer	  2013).	  There	  are,	  however,	   two	  mechanisms	   that	  can	  be	  distinguished	  here.	   “Relative	  power	  theory”	  (Goodin	  and	  Dryzek	  1980)	  postulates	  that	  increasing	  inequality	  concen-­‐trates	  power	  among	  the	  rich,	  which	  is	  why	  they	  more	  consistently	  prevail	  in	  po-­‐litical	  conflict,	  teaching	  the	  poorer	  citizens	  that	  their	  goals	  cannot	  be	  effectively	  pursued	   through	   the	   political	   process.	   This	   is	   the	   “incentive-­‐model”	   of	   with-­‐drawal.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   “resource-­‐theory”	   of	   political	   participation	  holds	  that	  relatively	  poorer	  individuals	  tend	  to	  abstain	  from	  political	  participation,	  be-­‐cause	  they	  lack	  time,	  money,	  social	  and	  cognitive	  skills	  to	  engage	  in	  politics	  (Ver-­‐ba,	  Schlozman	  and	  Brady	  1995,	  Gallego	  2010).	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  abstain	  be-­‐cause	   they	  don’t	   have	   the	  necessary	   resources	   to	  participate,	   not	  because	   they	  rationally	   decide	   to	  withdraw.	   Citizens	  with	   higher	   levels	   of	   resources,	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	  have	   the	  necessary	   resources,	   skills	   and	  psychological	  dispositions	  (interest	  and	  knowledge)	  to	  participate	  in	  politics	  anyway.	  Therefore,	  increasing	  inequality	  should	  depress	  participation	  among	  the	  disadvantaged,	  while	  the	  par-­‐ticipation	  of	  the	  upper	  classes	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  stable	  and	  strong.	  	  	  As	  we	  could	  see	  from	  this	  short	  review	  of	  the	  literature,	  existing	  theories	  tend	  to	  explain	  variations	  in	  turnout	  mostly	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  (non-­‐)participation	  of	  the	  more	  disadvantaged	  social	  strata	  (in	  terms	  of	  income,	  education	  or	  more	  general	  socio-­‐economic	   resources),	   assuming	   that	   economically	   and	   cognitively	   more	  privileged	  citizens	  tend	  to	  participate	  strongly	  in	  any	  case.	  The	  positive	  link	  be-­‐tween	   social	   status	   and	  participation	  has	   been	   asserted	  mostly	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  cognitive	   arguments,	   i.e.	  with	   regard	   to	   education.	  The	  positive	   correlation	  be-­‐tween	  education	  and	  participation	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  one	  of	  most	  solid	  evidence	  provided	   by	   the	   literature	   on	   political	   participation,	   be	   it	   that	   education	   is	   re-­‐garded	  as	  driver	  of	  political	  activity	  per	  se	  or	  rather	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  a	  much	  larger	  concept	  of	  cognitive	  and	  social	  resources	  (Kam	  and	  Palmer	  2008;	  Gallego	  2010).	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However,	   such	   a	   view	   overlooks	   a	   striking	   puzzle:	   tentative	   evidence	   suggests	  that	  during	   the	   recent	  economic	   crisis,	   electoral	   turnout	   in	   some	  countries	  has	  declined	  even	  among	  the	  highly	  educated	  classes	  (Gubler	  2013).	  The	  assumption	  that	  high	  levels	  of	  resources	  guarantee	  high	  levels	  of	  participation	  might	  thus	  no	  longer	  hold	  for	  all	  electoral	  contests.	  Hence,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  hidden	  side	  to	  declining	  turnout	  that	  has	  so	  far	  been	  strongly	  neglected	  in	  theory	  and	  empirical	  research:	  what	  are	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  economic	  crisis	  on	  the	  better-­‐off?	  It	  is	  obvi-­‐ous	  that	  a	  resource-­‐model	  does	  not	  travel	  far	  in	  this	  respect,	  as	  these	  voters	  have	  all	  necessary	  social	  and	  cognitive	  skills	   to	  participate.	  Rather,	  we	  need	  to	   think	  about	  the	  changing	  incentives	  they	  are	  exposed	  to.	  	  
	  
3.	  The	  electoral	  calculus	  under	  conditions	  of	  constrained	  government	  The	   theorization	  of	   electoral	   calculus	   and	   incentive-­‐based	  electoral	  behavior	   is	  probably	  most	  fully	  developed	  in	  the	  theory	  of	  economic	  voting,	  which	  holds	  that	  voters	  punish	  or	  reward	  the	  government	  in	  line	  with	  the	  course	  of	  the	  economy	  (Key	  1966,	  Duch	  and	  Stevenson	  2008,	  Fossati	  2012).	  The	  empirical	  evidence	  for	  the	  economic	  vote	  overall	  is	  somewhat	  inconclusive	  and	  effects	  are	  substantively	  small	  generally	   (Kayser	  and	  Peress	  2013,	  Kayser	  and	  Wlezien	  2010,	  Fraile	  and	  Lewis-­‐Beck	  2013).	  However,	  the	  great	  merit	   in	  this	  literature	  is	  the	  recognition	  and	  theorization	  that	  incentive-­‐based	  electoral	  behavior	  is	  highly	  conditional:	  it	  matters	  more	  in	  certain	  (institutional)	  contexts	  than	  others	  and	  for	  certain	  indi-­‐viduals.	  More	  precisely,	   it	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  economic	  voting	  is	  more	  preva-­‐lent	   in	  contexts	  with	  higher	   levels	  of	   turnout	  (Bengtsson	  2004)	  and	  with	   lower	  levels	  of	  aggregate	  party	  identification	  (Kayser	  and	  Wlezien	  2010).	  Also,	  Gomez	  and	  Wilson	  (2006)	  found	  education	  to	  be	  positively	  related	  to	  the	  likelihood	  that	  citizens	  evaluate	  their	  governments	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  economic	  situation.	  This	  indicates	   that	   highly	   sophisticated	   voters	  without	   a	   strong	   party	   identification	  are	  more	  sensitive	  to	  incentive-­‐based	  electoral	  behavior.	  More	  importantly,	  even,	  it	  has	  become	  one	  of	  the	  main	  findings	  of	  this	  literature	  that	  economic	  voting	  is	  a	  forceful	  explanatory	   framework	  only	   in	  contexts	  of	   clearly	  attributable	  govern-­‐ment	   responsibility	   (Powell	   and	  Whitten	  1993;	  Duch	  and	  Stevenson	  2008;	  Ho-­‐bolt,	  Tilley	  and	  Banducci	  2012).	  If	  (highly	  sophisticated)	  voters	  understand	  that	  the	  responsibility	  for	  the	  course	  of	  the	  economy	  cannot	  be	  attributed	  clearly	  to	  a	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government	  party,	  economic	  performance	  does	  not	  predict	  vote	  choice.	  Hence,	  it	  seems	  straightforward	  to	  theorize	  the	  electoral	  calculus	  for	  highly	  informed,	  ra-­‐tional	  voters	  in	  such	  a	  context	  where	  accountability	  is	  severely	  constrained.	  The	   contributions	   by	  Hellwig	   (Hellwig	   and	   Samuels	   2007,	  Hellwig	   2008)	  most	  explicitly	   take	   such	   context	   effects	   into	   account.	   Hellwig	   shows	   that	   economic	  voting	  is	  less	  prevalent	  in	  economically	  interdependent	  (“globalized”)	  countries,	  because	   citizens	   realize	   that	   the	   globalization-­‐induced	   government	   constraints	  make	  it	  much	  harder	  to	  hold	  governments	  accountable	  for	  economic	  outcomes.	  However,	   even	   Hellwig	   theorizes	   only	   vote	   choice,	   not	   vote	   participation.	   The	  question	  why	  “an	  economic	  voter”	  would	  participate	  at	  all	  in	  the	  election	  under	  such	   circumstances	   remains	   unanswered.	   Participation	   is	   a	   question	   that	   the	  economic	   voting	   literature	   has	   hardly	   ever	   addressed,	   however.	   Indeed,	   most	  applications	  of	  economic	  voting	  theories	  do	  not	  address	  vote	  abstention	  at	  all,	  a	  fact	   that	   has	   already	   drawn	   a	   lot	   of	   criticism	   (Tillman	   2008,	   Bengtsson	   2004,	  Bohl	  and	  Kriesi	  2013).	  This	  is	  where	  we	  place	  our	  argument:	  we	  argue	  that	  con-­‐strained	  government	  affects	  individuals'	  expectations	  about	  the	  costs	  and	  bene-­‐fits	   of	   voting,	   and	   we	   therefore	   argue	   that	   government	   constraints	   are	   conse-­‐quential	  for	  citizens'	  willingness	  to	  engage	  in	  electoral	  participation,	  at	  all.	  	  	  Indeed,	  governments	  in	  countries	  hard	  hit	  by	  the	  recent	  financial	  economic	  crisis	  are	  heavily	  constrained	  in	  their	  economic	  policy	  making	  capacity	  by	  the	  interna-­‐tional	  financial	  markets,	  as	  well	  as	  European	  and	  international	  policy	  measures	  (Pontusson	   and	   Raess	   2012).	   We	   maintain	   that	   constraint	   government	   works	  similar	   to	  macroeconomic	   variables	   in	   economic	   voting	  models:	   voters	   include	  the	   perception	   of	   their	   government's	   political	   and	   economic	   constraints	   into	  their	  consideration	  whether	  it	  is	  worth	  to	  go	  to	  the	  polls.	  It	  seems	  intuitive	  that	  once	  a	  person	  reaches	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  new	  government	  has	  only	  a	  small	  room	  to	  manoeuvre	  disregarded	  its	  ideological	  and	  coalitional	  composition	  (be-­‐cause	  of	  external	  and	  internal	  political	  and	  economic	  pressures),	  the	  willingness	  to	  bear	  the	  costs	  of	  voting	  (i.e.	  the	  investment	  in	  time	  it	  takes	  to	  acquire	  enough	  information	  for	  a	  decision	  and	  carry	  out	  the	  actual	  voting	  procedure)	  is	  likely	  to	  decrease.	  However	  this	  anticipation	  of	  political	  inefficacy	  of	  the	  government	  re-­‐quires	   a	  high	   level	   of	  political	   sophistication	   and	  knowledge.	  Citizens	  with	   low	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levels	  of	  education	  still	  tend	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  national	  governments	  with	  their	  frus-­‐trations	   about	   the	   effects	   of	   increasingly	   globalized	  markets	   (Häusermann	   and	  Kriesi	   2012).	   Therefore,	   government	   constraints	   are	   expected	   to	   weaken	   the	  otherwise	  positive	  effects	  of	  education	  on	  participation,	  thereby	  lowering	  partic-­‐ipation	  rates	  among	  the	  highly	  educated.	  	  	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  expect	  that	  the	  politico-­‐economic	  turmoil	  of	  the	  last	  years	  has	  altered	   the	   relationship	   between	   education	   and	   political	   participation.	   Higher	  education	  is	  not	  as	  univocally	  related	  to	  a	  higher	  propensity	  to	  cast	  a	  vote	  as	   it	  was	  before	  the	  crisis,	  since	  citizens	  are	  expected	  to	  increasingly	  include	  consid-­‐erations	  about	  their	  governments	  crisis	  management	  capacity	  into	  their	  pocket-­‐book	   evaluations.	   Therefore,	  we	  hypothesize	   an	   interaction	   effect:	   government	  constraints	  are	  expected	  to	  weaken	  the	  positive	  effect	  of	  education	  on	  electoral	  participation.	  This	  is	  what	  we	  will	  test	  in	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  paper.	  	  
4.	  Data	  and	  methods	  To	   test	   our	   hypotheses,	   we	   use	   data	   from	   the	   European	   Social	   Survey	   (ESS)	  round	   5,	   the	   European	   Union	   Statistics	   on	   income	   and	   living	   conditions	   (EU-­‐SILC)	  2,	  as	  well	  as	  several	  country-­‐level	  data	  sources	  (for	  an	  overview,	  see	  Table	  A.1	   and	  A.2	   in	   the	   appendix).	   The	   intersection	   of	   these	   data	   sources	   allows	   to	  conduct	  the	  analyses	  for	  28’841	  respondents	  in	  the	  following	  22	  countries:	  Bul-­‐garia,	   Cyprus,	   Czech	   Republic,	   Germany,	   Denmark,	   Estonia,	   Spain,	   Finland,	  France,	  Greece,	  Hungary,	   Ireland,	   Lithuania,	  Netherlands,	  Norway,	  Poland,	  Por-­‐tugal,	  Sweden,	  Slovenia,	  Slovak	  Republic,	  United	  Kingdom.	  	  Our	  main	  independent	  variable	  at	  the	  individual	  level,	  education,	  is	  based	  on	  the	  International	   Standard	  Classification	  of	  Education	   (ISCED).	   In	  ESS	  2010,	   a	  very	  detailed	   version	   of	   ISCED	  with	   26	   codes	   is	   reported.	  We	   recoded	   this	   variable	  and	  constructed	  an	  9-­‐item	  scale	  by	  using	  only	  the	  first	  digit	  of	  the	  ISCED	  classifi-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The	  much	  higher	  number	  of	  respondents	  in	  EU-­‐SILC	  –	  compared	  to	  ESS	  -­‐	  allows	  for	  a	  more	  reli-­‐able	  calculation	  of	  group-­‐specific	  risk	  of	  precarious	  employment.	  
	   9	  
cation.	   The	   resulting	   measure	   of	   highest	   level	   of	   education	   ranges	   from	   “not	  completed	  primary	  school”	  to	  “doctoral	  degree”.3	  	  To	  account	  for	  incentive-­‐based	  electoral	  behavior	  in	  times	  of	  economic	  hardship,	  we	   include	  a	  variable	  measuring	   the	   individual	   risk	  of	  precarious	  employment.	  Similarly	   to	   Rehm’s	   (2009)	   work	   on	   unemployment	   risk,	   we	   calculate	   group-­‐specific	  frequencies	  of	  precarious	  employment	  and/or	  unemployment.	  To	  identi-­‐fy	   the	   relevant	   groups,	   we	   use	   the	   streamlined	   class	   scheme	   by	   Oesch	   (2006)	  that	  distinguishes	  between	  eight	  different	  occupational	  groups,	  e.g.	  “small	  busi-­‐ness	  owners”	  or	   “office	   clerks”.	  We	   compute	   group-­‐specific	   rates	  of	   unemploy-­‐ment,	   involuntary	  part-­‐time	  and	  temporary	  employment	  as	  well	  as	  national	  av-­‐erages	   in	   the	  EU-­‐SILC	  household	  panel	  2010.	  Next,	   the	  average	  rate	  among	   the	  total	  workforce	  is	  subtracted	  from	  the	  group-­‐specific	  rates	  in	  each	  country	  in	  or-­‐der	  to	  obtain	  group-­‐specific	  deviations	  (over-­‐	  or	  underrepresentation)	  of	  unem-­‐ployment,	   involuntary	  part-­‐time	  or	   temporary	  employment.	  The	  mean	  of	   these	  three	   standardized	   deviations	   provides	   us	   with	   a	   continuous,	   group-­‐specific	  measure	  of	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  hit	  by	  precarious	  employment	  in	  each	  country.	  We	  then	  attribute	  these	  values	  to	  the	  respondents	  in	  our	  main	  dataset,	  the	  ESS	  2010,	  by	  using	  occupational	  codes.4	  	  In	  order	  to	  better	  isolate	  the	  impact	  of	  our	  main	  independent	  variables,	  we	  con-­‐trol	  for	  additional	  factors	  at	  the	  individual	  level	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  affect	  participa-­‐tion.	  Two	  demographic	  characteristics	  (age,	  gender)	  as	  well	  as	  income	  and	  inter-­‐est	   in	  politics	  are	   included	   in	   the	  models	   (see	  Solt	  2008).	   In	   the	  ESS,	   income	   is	  reported	   in	   deciles	   and	   the	   variable	  measuring	   political	   interest	   is	   based	   on	   a	  four	   item	   scale.	   These	   items	   have	   been	   recoded	   so	   that	   higher	   values	   indicate	  more	  interest	  in	  politics.	  We	  also	  made	  two	  specific	  changes	  on	  single	  variables	  in	  the	  ESS	  data.	  In	  Portu-­‐gal,	  the	  level	  of	  income	  unfortunately	  was	  asked	  in	  a	  slightly	  different	  way	  than	  in	  the	  other	  countries,	  which	  results	   in	  a	  12-­‐item	  scale	   instead	  of	   the	  usual	  10-­‐item	  scale	  (see	  ESS	  doc).	  We	  therefore	  had	  to	  rescale	  the	  variable	  for	  Portugal	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  relatively	  small	  size	  of	  the	  groups	  with	  minimal	  and	  maximal	  education,	  respectively,	  does	  not	  affect	  our	  analysis.	  The	  results	  are	  robust	  to	  a	  recoded	  7-­‐item	  scale	  of	  our	  measure	  for	  edu-­‐cation.	  4	  For	   an	   extensive	  discussion	  of	   a	   similar	   operationalization	  of	   labor	  market	   risk	   as	  well	   as	   its	  validity	  and	  implications,	  see	  Häusermann/Schwander	  (2013).	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order	   to	   include	   it	   into	   the	  models.5	  In	  addition,	  we	   include	  the	  quadratic	   func-­‐tion	   of	   age	   into	   the	   analyses	   to	   account	   for	   live-­‐cycle	   effects	   (see	   Blais	   et	   al.	  2004).	  	  At	   the	   country	   level,	  we	   consider	   three	   specific	   indicators	   of	   government	   con-­‐straint.	  First,	  we	  anticipate	  a	  soaring	  public	  deficit	  to	  be	  a	  major	  aspect	  of	  a	  gov-­‐ernment’s	  room	  to	  maneuver,	  since	  political	  and	  market	  pressures	  for	  austerity	  measures	  are	  likely	  to	  increase	  with	  the	  accumulation	  of	  public	  debt.	  We	  opera-­‐tionalize	   public	   deficit	  with	   the	   2010	  World	   Bank	   development	   indicator	   data,	  where	  it	  is	  defined	  as	  cash	  deficit	  in	  percentages	  of	  GDP.6	  Second,	  conditionality	  as	  a	  result	  of	  bailouts	  by	  the	  Troika	  (i.e.	  the	  European	  Commission	  (EC),	  the	  Eu-­‐ropean	  Central	  Bank	  (ECB)	  and	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF))	  can	  be	  perceived	   as	   important	   confining	   factor	   for	   the	   governments	   of	   affected	   coun-­‐tries.	  Since	  the	  ESS	  survey	  field	  work	  was	  done	  from	  mid-­‐2010	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  2011	  in	  most	  countries,	  we	  coded	  all	  four	  countries	  which	  had	  to	  apply	  for	  fi-­‐nancial	  assistance	  programs	  in	  2010	  or	  2011	  –	  namely	  Hungary,	  Greece,	  Portugal	  and	   Ireland	   –	   as	   countries	   under	   conditionality.	   Third,	   not	   only	   political	   con-­‐straints	   can	   hamper	   the	   scope	   of	   governmental	   action,	   but	   also	   economic	   con-­‐straints.	  Most	  notably,	  we	  regard	  financial	  market	  pressures	  stemming	  from	  dif-­‐ficulties	   to	   issue	  government	  bonds	   in	  order	   finance	  public	  activities	  as	  a	   chal-­‐lenge	   for	   suffering	   governments,	   not	   only	  because	  of	   the	   actual	   financial	   prob-­‐lems	  but	  also	  because	  of	   the	  accompanying	  media	   frenzy	  and	  public	  outcry.	  As	  indicator,	  we	  rely	  on	  the	  long-­‐term	  interest	  rates	  for	  government	  bond	  yields	  in	  2010	  as	  reported	  by	   the	  OECD	  and	  Eurostat.	  Obviously,	   the	   three	  variables	  are	  substantially	  correlated,7	  which	  is	  why	  we	  decided	  to	  run	  four	  separate	  models:	  one	   including	   a	   factor	   of	   the	   three	   indicators	   and	   one	   for	   each	   indicator	   inde-­‐pendently.	  The	  factor	  scores	  result	  from	  a	  varimax	  rotated	  maximum-­‐likelihood	  factor	  analysis	  on	  the	  three	  single	   indicators	  in	  the	  crisis	  years	  2009	  and	  2010.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  We	  also	  ran	  tests	  by	  including	  or	  excluding	  the	  income	  variable	  as	  well	  as	  the	  data	  from	  Portu-­‐gal	  in	  the	  regression	  models	  presented	  in	  the	  analysis	  and	  did	  not	  found	  any	  deviating	  results.	  6	  More	  precisely,	  revenue	  (including	  grants)	  minus	  expense,	  minus	  net	  acquisition	  of	  nonfinancial	  assets.	  7	  Pearson’s	  R	  of	  0.39	   (deficit	   and	  bond	  yields),	  0.57	   (deficit	   and	  conditionality)	  and	  0.71	   (bond	  yields	  and	  conditionality).	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To	   control	   for	   general	   cross-­‐sectional	   variances	   in	   terms	  of	   the	   severity	   of	   the	  economic	  crisis,	  we	  include	  the	  GDP	  growth	  per	  capita8	  in	  2010	  into	  the	  calcula-­‐tions.	  Finally,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  distinguish	  the	  more	  recently	  democratized	  coun-­‐tries	  of	  Eastern	  Europe	  from	  the	  Western	  European	  countries,	  since	  the	  former	  show	  systematically	  lower	  turnout	  levels	  (Pop-­‐Eleches	  and	  Tucker	  2013).	  Other	  potential	  macro-­‐level	  covariates	  such	  as	  compulsory	  voting	  or	  party	  fractionali-­‐zation	  so	  far	  are	  so	  far	  not	  considered	  because	  of	  the	  rather	  low	  number	  of	  coun-­‐tries	  and	  corresponding	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  available	  at	  the	  macro	  level.	  	  As	  for	  the	  calculations,	  we	  rely	  on	  hierarchical	  regression	  models	  including	  log-­‐likelihood	  ration	  tests	  comparing	  the	  models	  to	  the	  fit	  of	  the	  empty	  model	  (Table	  1)	  as	  well	  as	  on	  simulations	  of	  the	  predicted	  probabilities	  (Figure	  1)	  and	  margin-­‐al	  effects	  (Figure	  2).	  Robustness	  checks	  included	  an	  outlier	  analysis	  (Greece	  with	  respect	  to	  government	  bond	  yields,	  Ireland	  with	  regards	  deficit),	  the	  inclusion	  of	  survey	  and	  sample	  weights	  (using	  the	  gllamm	  library	  in	  Stata),	  the	  exclusion	  of	  the	   indicator	   for	   income	   in	   light	  of	   the	  considerable	  colinearity	  with	  education,	  as	   well	   as	   the	   consideration	   of	   lagged	   country-­‐level	   covariates.	   None	   of	   these	  specifications	  led	  to	  substantial	  changes	  in	  the	  results.	  	  
5.	  How	  constrained	  government	  affects	  the	  relationship	  between	  education	  
and	  participation	  	  The	  estimated	  coefficients,	  standard	  errors	  and	  significance	  levels	  of	  our	  models	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  1.	  To	  support	  the	  interpretation	  of	  these	  results,	  we	  plot	  the	  simu-­‐lated	  predicted	  probabilities	  for	  different	   levels	  of	  education	  in	  dependence	  on	  the	  indicators	  of	  government	  constraint	  in	  Figure	  1	  as	  well	  as	  the	  marginal	  effects	  of	  ed-­‐ucation	  in	  interaction	  with	  government	  constraint	  in	  Figure	  2.9	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Sources:	  World	  Bank	  and	  OECD	  National	  Accounts	  data.	  9	  We	   show	   the	   predicted	   probabilities	   and	  marginal	   effects	  with	   the	   control	   variables	   fixed	   at	  zero	  (dichotomous	  variables)	  as	  well	  as	  their	  mean	  (continuous	  variables).	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Table 1: Hierarchical logit regression models predicting electoral participation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Fixed effects       











Individual level       



































































































Contextual level       
Government constraint – -0.067 (0.105) 
0.031 
(0.109) 
– – – 
EducationXGovernment con-
straint 
– – -0.035*** 
(0.010) 
– – – 
Deficit – – – 0.005 (0.013) 
– – 
EducationXDeficit – – – -0.008*** (0.001) 
– – 




– – – – -0.021*** 
(0.005) 
– 
Conditionality – – – – – 0.059 (0.260) 
EducationXConditionality – – – – – -0.060* (0.023) 





















Random Effects       




























Model Properties       






















Notes: Unstandardized logit coefficients; standard errors in brackets. One-tailed significance tests, levels: *** p ≤ 
0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. Reference categories: a=Male; b=Not at all interested in politics; c=Western Europe. d 
Likelihood ratio compared to empty model. 	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Model	  1	  shows	  a	  baseline	  specification	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  validity	  of	  our	  mi-­‐cro-­‐level	  operationalizations.	  It	  consists	  of	  all	  individual	  level	  predictors,	  the	  multi-­‐level	   specification	  and	  a	   random	  slope	   for	  education.	  Over	  all	   countries,	  education	  unsuprisingly	  picks	  up	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  variation	  in	  electoral	  participation	  in	  mod-­‐el	  1.	  The	  increase	  of	  one	  unit	  in	  education	  changes	  the	  odds	  in	  favor	  of	  participation	  to	   1.10.	   In	   general,	   the	   predicted	   probabilities	   change	   from	  0.78	   to	   0.87	   from	   the	  lowest	  to	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  education	  (see	  Figure	  2).	  	  	  The	  effects	  related	   to	   the	  control	  variables	  age,	   interest	   in	  politics	  and	   income	  are	  highly	  significant	  and	  work	  in	  the	  direction	  as	  expected	  by	  extant	  studies	  on	  partici-­‐pation	   (e.g.	   Solt	   2008,	  Gallego	  2010).	   The	   two	   remaining	   controls,	   precarious	   em-­‐ployment	  risk	  and	  gender,	  are	  very	  interestingly	  associated	  with	  participation.	  The	  highly	  significant	  negative	  relationship	  of	  employment	  risk	  with	  participation	  is	  re-­‐markable	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  magnitude.	  Ceteris	  paribus,	  a	  person	  confronted	  with	  a	  with	  an	  increase	  of	  0.77	  in	  the	  precarity	  of	  her	  employment	  situation	  –	  one	  standard	  deviation	  in	  our	  operationalization,	  see	  Table	  A.1	  –,	  exhibits	  an	  odds	  ratio	  of	  about	  5:6	  (0.85)	  to	  cast	  a	  vote	  compared	  to	  a	  person	  with	  a	   less	  risky	  occupational	  envi-­‐ronment.	  Economic	  risks	  –	  at	  least	  if	  measured	  at	  the	  occupational	  level	  –	  are	  thus	  very	   relevant	   predictors	   of	   participation,	   even	   though	   studies	   on	   individual	   level	  and	  marco-­‐level	  economic	  risks	  so	   far	  have	  quarried	  quite	  ambivalent	  results	   (see	  Bengtson	  2004).	  Likewise,	  the	  sigificant	  and	  strong	  increase	  in	  the	  likelihood	  of	  vot-­‐ing	   for	   women	   compared	   to	   men	   (odds	   ratio	   of	   1.30	   –	   everything	   else	   equal)	   is	  noteworthy	  in	  light	  of	  the	  recent	  literature	  suggesting	  a	  narrowing	  of	  the	  gender	  di-­‐vide	  in	  terms	  of	  participation	  (see	  Gallego	  2006).	  The	  results	  therefore	  suggest	  that	  the	  crisis	  has	  reversed	  the	  traditionally	  higher	  willingness	  of	  men	  to	  vote,	  but,	  as	  for	  economic	  risk,	  a	  more	  extensive	  inspection	  of	  this	  relationship	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study.	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Figure 1: Predicted probabilities of electoral participation for different levels of educa-
tion, depending on government constraint indicators 
	  
	  
Figure 2: Estimated marginal effects of education if interacted with government con-
straint indicators 
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The	  contribution	  of	   these	   individual	   level	  predictors	   in	   the	  models	  2	   to	  6	   is	  highly	  consistent	  with	  the	  ones	  in	  model	  1,	  which	  points	  to	  the	  robustness	  of	  our	  individual	  level	   specification.	   As	   for	   country	   level	   covariates,	   we	   introduce	   GDP	   growth	   in	  2010,	  the	  predictor	  controlling	  for	  countries	  with	  rather	  recent	  democratization	  (i.e.	  Eastern	   European	   states)	   and	   our	  main	   explanatory	   variable	   –	   the	   factor	   variable	  measuring	   different	   dimensions	   of	   government	   constraint	   (public	   deficit,	   govern-­‐ment	  bond	  yields,	  and	  conditionality)	  –	  in	  model	  2.	  The	  only	  country	  level	  variable,	  which	  –	  on	  the	  aggregate	  –	  is	  substantially	  related	  to	  turnout	  is	  the	  dichotomous	  dis-­‐tinction	  between	  Eastern	  and	  Western	  European	  countries.	  Eastern	  Europeans	  have	  a	   systematically	   lower	   propensity	   to	   go	   to	   the	   ballots,	   which	   in	   the	   literature	   is	  mainly	   explained	   by	   frustration	   about	   corruption	   and	   the	   ramifications	   of	   com-­‐munist	  legacies	  (see	  Pop-­‐Eleches	  and	  Tucker	  2013).	  As	  such,	  government	  constraint	  and	  GDP	  growth	  do	  not	  add	  explanatory	  power	  to	  the	  prediction.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	   our	   initially	   discussed	   evidence	   on	   the	   seemingly	   inexistent	   relationship	   be-­‐tween	  the	  economic	  crisis	  and	  turnout	  levels.	  	  In	  model	   3	   to	   6,	  we	   test	   the	   interaction	   effects	   of	   different	   operationalizations	   of	  government	   constraint	   and	   education	   in	   a	   stepwise	   fashion.	   The	  main	   finding	  we	  want	   to	   emphasize	   here	   is	   that	   government	   constraint	   substantially	  moderates	   the	  
effect	  education	  has	  on	  participation.	  The	  upper	  right	  graph	  in	  Figure	  2	  shows	  that	  in	  countries	  where	  public	  deficit,	  government	  bond	  yields	  and	  conditionality	  work	   in	  favor	  of	  a	  governments	  room	  to	  maneuver,	  education	  is	  related	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  predicted	   probability	   of	   over	   10	   percentage	   points.	   In	   countries	   with	   an	   average	  strength	  of	  government	  constraint,	  the	  positive	  effect	  of	  education	  is	  slightly	  moder-­‐ated.	  The	  crucial	  difference	  occurs	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  countries	  with	  a	  strongly	  con-­‐strained	  government,	  namely	  Greece,	  Portugal,	  Hungary	  and	  Ireland	  in	  our	  sample.	  Here,	  education	  ceases	   to	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  participation.	  This	   is	  confirmed	  by	   the	  visualization	  of	  the	  marginal	  effects	  in	  Figure	  3.	  At	  a	  level	  of	  about	  1.5	  of	  our	  factor	  for	   constrained	   government	   	   –	  which	   separates	   the	   heavily	   constrained	   countries	  from	   the	   other	   countries	   –,	   the	  positive	   relationship	   of	   education	  on	  participation	  becomes	  insignificant.	  According	  to	  our	  argumentation,	  this	  outcome	  is	  the	  effect	  of	  pessimistic	  expectations	  by	  the	  better	  educated	  on	  the	  leverage	  their	  vote	  has	  with	  regards	  to	  government	  effectiveness.	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  We	  believe	   that	  government	  constraint	  during	   the	  economic	  and	   financial	  crisis	  of	  the	  last	  years	  is	  a	  complex	  occurrence	  shaped	  by	  several	  aspects	  of	  the	  domestic	  and	  international	  politico-­‐economic	  context.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  graphs	  in	  Figure	  2	  and	  3	  show	   that	   the	   single	   indicators	   of	   our	   government	   constraint	   indicator	   have	   the	  same	  moderating	  or	  even	  reversing	  effect	  on	  the	  education-­‐participation	  nexus.	  At	  a	  public	   deficit	   of	   about	   –12%	   or	   below,	   under	   conditionality	   from	   financial	   agree-­‐ments	  with	  the	  EU,	  ECB	  or	  IMF,	  or	  at	  a	  government	  bond	  yield	  rate	  of	  about	  6.5%	  or	  above,	   education	   ceases	   to	   be	   the	   strong	   explanatory	   factor	   it	   usually	   is.	   Soaring	  public	  deficit,	  such	  as	  the	  -­‐31%	  of	  GDP	  in	  Ireland,	  even	  dramatically	  reverses	  the	  in-­‐fluence	  of	  education.	  Likewise,	  conditionality	  in	  the	  context	  of	  international	  financial	  agreements	  substantially	  lowers	  the	  propensity	  of	  individuals	  with	  upper	  secondary	  level	  education	  or	  higher.	  And	  as	  for	  government	  bond	  yields,	  they	  are	  also	  reverting	  the	  effect	  of	  education	  if	  they	  are	  painfully	  high	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Greece	  (9.09%).	  It	  has	  to	  be	  emphasized	  that,	  although	  we	  have	  only	  a	  few	  countries	  in	  the	  sample	  with	  a	   high	   government	   constraint,	   the	   effects	   are	   not	   systematically	   driven	   by	   single	  cases.	  The	  exclusion	  of	  outliers	  –	  Ireland	  in	  the	  model	  estimating	  the	  effect	  of	  public	  deficit	  as	  well	  as	  Greece	  in	  the	  model	  including	  government	  bond	  yields	  –	  does	  nei-­‐ther	  affect	  the	  significance	  nor	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  government	  constraint	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  education	  and	  participation.	  	  
6.	  Why	  should	  constrained	  government	  moderate	  educational	  effects?	  In	   the	   analysis	   above,	  we	  provided	  evidence	   for	   remarkable	   consequences	  of	   con-­‐strained	   governments	   on	   the	   behaviour	   of	   highly	   educated	   eligible	   voters	   at	   the	  polls.	   If	   this	   is	  a	  more	  general	   finding,	  we	  should	  not	  only	  observe	  vote	  abstention	  but	  also	  a	  more	  general	  discontent	  with	  the	  political	  situation	  in	  the	  country	  among	  the	   high	   educated	   people.	   Thus,	   if	   sophisticated	   individuals	   indeed	   anticipate	   the	  inefficacy	  of	  governments	  in	  national	  elections,	  their	  absence	  from	  the	  ballot	  should	  be	  accompanied	  by	  a	   loss	  of	   confidence	   in	   the	  authority	   and	  performance	  of	   their	  government	  and	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  political	  system	  at	  large	  (Clarke	  and	  Acock	  1989).	   In	  other	  words,	   if	  people	  do	  not	  belief	  that	  the	  political	  system	  responds	  to	  citizen	  involvement	  and	  is	  not	  able	  to	  provide	  relief	  in	  dire	  economic	  situations,	  the	  act	  of	   voting	  becomes	  meaningless	  or	   at	   least	   very	   ineffective.	   For	   reasons	  of	   cor-­‐
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roboration	   of	   our	   findings,	   we	   therefore	   re-­‐examine	   the	   proposed	  mechanism	   on	  cross-­‐level	   interactions	  with	  two	  alternative	  -­‐	  but	   likely	  related	  -­‐	  dependent	  varia-­‐bles.	  First,	  we	  test	  whether	  the	  reversed	  effect	  of	  higher	  education	  in	  severely	  con-­‐strained	  countries	  is	  also	  observed	  with	  regard	  to	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  government.	  Voters	  who	  recognize	  the	  constrained	  power	  of	  their	  national	  government	  can	  hard-­‐ly	  be	  pleased	  with	  its	  performance	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Vote	  abstention	  could	  therefore	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  expression	  of	  frustration.	  Yet,	  in	  this	  case,	  abstention	  is	  not	  the	  only	  conceivable	  outcome,	  since	  growing	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  government	  might	  simply	  lead	  to	  increasing	  support	  of	  opposition	  or	  protest	  parties.	  In	  contrast,	  indi-­‐viduals	  who	  realize	   that	   their	  vote	  might	  be	   fully	  meaningless	   in	   circumstances	  of	  strong	  austerity	  constraints,	  might	  as	  well	  display	  discontent	  with	  the	  political	  sys-­‐tem	  in	  much	  more	  general	  terms.	  Vote	  abstention	  would	  therefore	  come	  close	  to	  a	  more	  general	  alienation	  from	  the	  political	  system.	  That	  is	  why	  we	  additionally	  exam-­‐ine	   the	   response	  patterns	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  broader	  question	  of	   satisfaction	  with	  
how	  democracy	  works	  in	  the	  respondent’s	  country.	  	  Both	   just	   introduced	   alternative	   operationalizations	   of	   political	   engagement	   range	  from	  1	  to	  10,	  where	  higher	  values	  indicate	  higher	  levels	  of	  satisfaction.	  Apart	  from	  the	  dependent	  variables,	  the	  model	  specifications	  presented	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  remains	   unaltered.	   Table	   2	   displays	   the	   predicted	   values	   of	   satisfaction	  with	   gov-­‐ernment	  and	  the	  way	  democracy	  works,	  respectively,	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  education	  and	  government	  constraint.10	  	  	  
Table 2: Average predicted values for satisfaction with government and satisfaction with 
how democracy works at different levels of education and government constraint 
  






or higher Difference 
Government 
constraint 
minimum 5.08 5.23 0.15 
average 4.88 4.96 0.08 
maximum 4.28 4.21 -0.07 
Government 
constraint 
minimum 6.13 6.47 0.34 
average 5.81 6.04 0.23 
maximum 4.89 4.80 -0.09 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Due	  to	  the	  different	  scale	  of	  the	  dependent	  variables,	  a	  linear	  multilevel	  model	  instead	  of	  hier-­‐archical	  ordered	  logit	  models	  has	  been	  calculated.	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The	   overall	   picture	   strikingly	   resembles	   the	   results	   from	   our	   previous	   analysis:	  While	  highly	  educated	  persons	  usually	  assess	  political	  circumstances	  more	  positive-­‐ly	   than	   lower	   educated	   individuals,	   this	   pattern	   is	   reversed	   for	   the	   severely	   con-­‐strained	   countries.	   This	   is	   not	   only	   true	   for	   the	   evaluation	   of	   the	   current	   govern-­‐ment’s	  performance,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  political	  system	  in	  general.	  Compared	   to	   lower	   educated	   voters,	   politically	   sophisticated	   individuals	   indeed	  seem	  to	  place	  more	  weight	  on	  governmental	  constraints	  and	  factor	  this	  knowledge	  in	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  political	  engagement.	  Abstention	  is	  a	  very	  likely	  to	  co-­‐exist	  with	  such	  a	  negative	  overall	  assessment.	  Therefore,	  this	  additional	  evidence	  gives	  further	  credence	  to	  the	  proposed	  mechanism	  at	  work:	  Highly	  educated	  individuals	  in	  heavi-­‐ly	  constrained	  countries	  anticipate	  the	  inefficacy	  of	  their	  vote	  and	  therefore	  decide	  to	  abstain	  from	  the	  ballot.	  
	  
7.	  Conclusion	  While	  an	  increasing	  literature	  studies	  the	  political	  aftermath	  of	  the	  great	  reces-­‐sion,	  we	  still	  know	  little	  about	  whether	  and	  why	  people	  in	  the	  ongoing	  economic	  crisis	  participate	  at	  all	  in	  the	  election	  of	  a	  new	  government.	  Moreover,	  while	  we	  can	  derive	  clear	  expectations	  on	  overall	  reactions	  to	  economic	  downturns	  in	  the	  participation	   literature,	   the	   empirical	   evidence	   is	   at	   least	   inconclusive.	   Claims	  that	   overall	   participation	   is	   systematically	   increasing	   or	   decreasing	   since	   the	  outbreak	   of	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis	   are	   at	   odds	   with	   the	   unsteady	   shifts	   in	  overall	  turnout	  levels.	  This	  is	  why	  we	  distinguished	  theoretical	  mechanisms	  and	  empirical	  effects	  for	  different	  social	  groups,	  notably	  with	  regard	  to	  education	  as	  one	  of	  the	  main	  drivers	  of	  political	  activity.	  While	  most	  theories	  on	  participatory	  inequality	  assume	  economically	  and	  cognitively	  more	  privileged	  citizens	  to	  par-­‐ticipate	   strongly	   in	   any	   context,	   we	   showed	   that	   with	   increasing	   political	   and	  economic	   austerity	   pressures	   weighting	   on	   their	   government,	   better	   educated	  voters	  tend	  to	  abstain	  from	  the	  polls	  as	  much	  or	  even	  more	  so	  than	  less	  well	  edu-­‐cated	  persons.	  Where	  public	  deficit,	  government	  bond	  yields	  and	  conditionality	  work	   in	   favor	  of	   a	   government’s	   room	   to	  maneuver,	  higher	   levels	  of	   education	  are	  related	  to	  a	  higher	  propensity	  to	  vote	  –	  just	  as	  the	  usual	  expectations	  in	  the	  participation	   literature	  would	   anticipate.	  Moreover,	   while	   the	   strongest	   differ-­‐ences	  in	  participation	  patterns	  occur	  in	  the	  countries	  with	  a	  severely	  constrained	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government,	   namely	   Greece,	   Portugal,	   Hungary	   and	   Ireland,	   government	   con-­‐straints	   also	   lower	   the	   willingness	   of	   highly	   educated	   persons	   to	   vote	   in	   only	  moderately	  affected	  countries.	  	  It	   seems	   intuitive	   that	  once	  a	  person	   reaches	   the	   conclusion	   that	   the	  new	  gov-­‐ernment	  has	  only	  a	  small	  room	  to	  manoeuver	  disregarded	  its	  ideological	  and	  co-­‐alitional	  composition,	   the	  willingness	   to	  bear	   the	  costs	  of	  voting	   is	   likely	   to	  de-­‐crease.	  	  Yet,	  this	  anticipation	  of	  political	  inefficacy	  of	  the	  government	  requires	  a	  high	   level	  of	  political	   sophistication	  and	  knowledge.	  The	   full	  political	   repercus-­‐sions	  caused	  by	  soaring	  public	  deficits,	  high	  government	  bond	  yield	  rates	  or	  the	  conditionality	   induced	  by	   financial	   agreements	   can	  be	   quite	   complex	   and	   even	  not	  easy	  to	  de.	  This	   is	  why	  we	  only	  found	  the	  moderating	  effect	  of	  government	  constraint	  only	  among	  the	  better	  educated.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  showed	  that	  con-­‐straint	  government	  works	  similar	  to	  macroeconomic	  variables	  in	  economic	  vot-­‐ing	  models:	   highly	   sophisticated	  voters	   include	   the	  perception	  of	   their	   govern-­‐ment's	  political	  and	  economic	  constraints	  into	  their	  calculus	  whether	  it	  is	  worth	  to	  go	  to	  the	  polls.	  	  Thus,	  the	  effect	  of	  government	  constraint,	  besides	  other	  non-­‐electoral	  consequences,	  leads	  to	  shifts	  in	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  electorate.	  This,	  of	   course,	   has	   important	   normative	   ramifications	   on	   the	   democratic	   quality	   of	  elections.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  a	  moderation	  of	  participatory	  inequalities	  caused	  by	  education	   should	   be	   welcomed,	   since	   this	   improves	   the	   representativeness	   of	  elections.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   our	  models	   predict	   that	   overall	   participation	   de-­‐creases,	  which	  posits	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  electoral	  contests.	   	  There-­‐fore,	  more	  equal	  participation	  at	  lower	  levels	  in	  the	  end	  does	  not	  seem	  desirable	  from	  a	  theoretical	  perspective.	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Appendix	  
	  
Table	  A.1:	  Micro	  level	  indicators	  used	  in	  the	  analysis	  
Variable	   Operationalization	   Mean	   Standard	  	  
Deviation	  
Education First digit of variable edulvlb in ESS 5 2010. “What 






Based on EU-SILC 2010; continuous variable, dif-
ference between group-specific rates of precarious 
employment / unemployment and the country-
specific average rate, value attributed to members 
of occupational categories in ESS 5 2010 
 
-0.02 0.77 
Gender Based on variable gndr in ESS 5 2010.  
“Sex of respondent”  
Recoded so that (0=male, 1=female) 
 
0.52 0.50 
Age	   Based	  on	  variable	  agea	  in	  ESS	  5	  2010.	  
“Age	  of	  respondent,	  calculated”	  
	  
51.14	   16.98	  
Interest	   Based on variable polintr in ESS 5 2010.  
“How interested would you say you are in politics – 
are you...?” 
Recoded so that (1=”not  at all interested in poli-
tics”, 4=”very interested in politics”) 
 
2.41	   0.90	  
Income	   Based on variable hinctnta in ESS 5 2010. 
“Household's total net income, all sources (in dec-
iles)”	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Belgium	   1.48	   -­‐0.47	   -­‐3.2	   0	   3.46	  
Bulgaria	   1.07	   -­‐0.35	   -­‐3.47	   0	   6.01	  
Cyprus	   -­‐2.29	   -­‐0.37	   -­‐5.23	   0	   4.6	  
Czech	  Republic	   2.17	   -­‐0.41	   -­‐4.74	   0	   3.88	  
Germany	   4.32	   -­‐0.50	   -­‐3.15	   0	   2.74	  
Denmark	   1.13	   -­‐0.51	   -­‐2.51	   0	   2.93	  
Estonia	   3.34	   -­‐0.63	   -­‐0.07	   0	   1.57	  
Spain	   -­‐0.67	   -­‐0.39	   -­‐5.23	   0	   4.25	  
Finland	   2.85	   -­‐0.50	   -­‐2.6	   0	   3.01	  
France	   1.21	   -­‐0.40	   -­‐7.02	   0	   3.12	  
Greece	   -­‐5.15	   1.95	   -­‐10.58	   1	   9.09	  
Hungary	   1.57	   1.71	   -­‐3.59	   1	   7.28	  
Ireland	   -­‐1.11	   2.28	   -­‐30.93	   1	   5.74	  
Lithuania	   3.12	   -­‐0.28	   -­‐7.36	   0	   5.57	  
Netherlands	   1.11	   -­‐0.47	   -­‐4.19	   0	   2.99	  
Norway	   -­‐0.77	   -­‐0.83	   12.2	   0	   3.53	  
Poland	   3.98	   -­‐0.28	   -­‐6.73	   0	   5.78	  
Portugal	   1.89	   1.75	   -­‐9	   1	   5.4	  
Sweden	   5.65	   -­‐0.56	   -­‐0.19	   0	   2.89	  
Slovenia	   0.82	   -­‐0.40	   -­‐5.51	   0	   3.83	  
Slovak	  Republic	   4.16	   -­‐0.37	   -­‐6.79	   0	   3.87	  
United	  Kingdom	   1.05	   -­‐0.31	   -­‐10.08	   0	   3.36	  	  
